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Case Note: Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez and the
Traditional Navajo Principle of Hazhó'ógo
Philip Morin1

ABSTRACT
In Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court
determined that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Miranda v. United
States provides minimum safeguards against self-incrimination in the custodial
interview context that are consistent with Navajo values. The Navajo Nation
Supreme Court went beyond Miranda’s requirements, holding that the traditional
Navajo principle of hazhó’ógo requires truthful, transparent explanations to, and
respectful treatment of, persons in police custody.2 In conducting its analysis, the
Court considered sources of relevant federal law, finding them consistent with
fundamental Navajo principles. At the same time, the Court looked to and
interpreted the Navajo Bill of Rights in a manner consistent with the Fundamental
Laws of the Diné. The Court’s opinion in Rodriguez fits squarely into both the
Court’s well-established practice of applying traditional Navajo principles to the
resolution of legal disputes and the Court’s more recent practice of implementing,
wherever appropriate, the directive of the Fundamental Laws to make Diné bi
beehaz’áanii, or Navajo Common Law, the fundamental basis for its decisions.

INTRODUCTION

The Navajo Nation police arrested Rafael Rodriguez in connection with a
shooting at a trailer park in Kayenta, Arizona.3 Kirk Snyder, an investigator with
the Navajo Nation Police, Kayenta District, conducted a custodial interview of Mr.
Rodriguez.4 Investigator Snyder began the interview by telling Mr. Rodriguez that
his acts could result in a federal prison sentence of up to 60 years and a fine of 1.5
million dollars.5 He then proffered an “advice of rights” form to Mr. Rodriguez for
his signature.6 The English language form purported to set forth Mr. Rodriguez’s
rights, with a statement apparently modeled on the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Miranda v. United States.7 Mr. Rodriguez signed the waiver printed at
1

University of New Mexico 2007 Law Graduate
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New Mexico School of Law during which the author was fortunate to be his pupil and research assistant.
The author also acknowledges fruitful discussions with Ernestine Tsinigine, University of New Mexico
School of Law Class of 2007, who completed an externship with the Supreme Court of the Navajo
Nation in 2005.
3
Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, No. SC-CR-03-04, 2004.NANN.0000014, ¶ 13 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Dec. 16,
2004) (VersusLaw).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. See Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
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the bottom of the form and then wrote out a confession in which he admitted to
being the shooter.8 There was no evidence in the record that Investigator Snyder
had explained any of the rights on the advice of rights form to Mr. Rodriguez.9 The
form contained numerous typographical, spelling and grammatical errors.10
Mr. Rodriguez was tried for the offense of Aggravated Assault in the
Kayenta District Court. 11 At trial, the Navajo Nation gained admission into
evidence of the advice of rights form and confession, over Mr. Rodriguez’s
objections. 12 The District Court found Mr. Rodriguez guilty and imposed a
sentence of one year’s incarceration. Mr. Rodriguez appealed his conviction to the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court (“Supreme Court” or “the Court”).13 The Supreme
Court heard oral argument on October 22, 2004. 14 Four days later, the Court
vacated the conviction and ordered Mr. Rodriguez’s immediate release.15
The Court treated the central issue of admissibility of Rodriguez’s
statement to police16 as two separate sub-issues:17 whether a coerced statement was
admissible as evidence18 and whether Rodriguez’s confession was “knowing and
voluntary,” as required by the Navajo Bill of Rights, in view of deficiencies in the
advice of rights form and the manner in which it was used.19 The Court held that
the fundamental right against self-incrimination is guaranteed under the Navajo Bill
of Rights and required by the traditional Navajo prohibition on coercion.20 The
right against coerced self-incrimination attaches when a criminal defendant is first
placed in custody and interviewed by police.21 The Court further held that any
degree of coercion violates the Navajo Bill of Rights, 1 N.N.C. § 8,22 and that the
impermissible coercion in Rodriguez’s case might of itself be sufficient to vacate
his conviction by the lower court.23
Turning to the issue of the admissibility of Mr. Rodriguez’ confession, the
Court held that it was not “voluntary” and was therefore inadmissible.24 In reaching
its conclusion, the Court considered numerous sources of federal law, including the
United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment to the United
8

Rodriguez, ¶ 13 (VersusLaw).
Id.
10
Id. ¶ 53 n.6.
11
Id. ¶ 14.
12
Id.
13
Rodriguez, ¶¶ 14-15. Mr. Rodriguez’s first appeal was remanded to the District Court for entry of
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id.¶ 15. Mr. Rodriguez subsequently filed the appeal that is the
subject of this case note. See id.
14
Id. ¶ 16.
15
Id.
16
Rodriguez ¶ 21.
17
Id. ¶ 23.
18
Id. ¶¶ 26-28.
19
Id. ¶¶ 30-41.
20
Id. ¶¶ 26-27.
21
Rodriguez, ¶ 27.
22
Id. ¶ 28. 1 N.N.C. § 8 provides that criminal defendants cannot be “compelled to be a witness against
themselves.” Id. See id., ¶ 26 (VersusLaw). The Navajo Nation did not dispute that Investigator Snyder
threatened Mr. Rodriguez by suggesting that he might face lengthy incarceration and a large fine before
he signed the advice of rights form. Id. ¶ 28. The Navajo Nation appears to have argued that Investigator
Snyder’s conduct constituted a “degree of coercion,” without defining “degree.” Id.
23
Rodriguez, ¶ 30.
24
Id. ¶ 41.
9
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States Constitution in Miranda v Arizona and the Indian Civil Rights Act
(“ICRA”).25 The Court also considered the Navajo Bill of Rights and the Court’s
related precedents.26 Eschewing federal interpretations of the Navajo Bill of Rights
and the ICRA,27 the Court, noting its directive from the Navajo Nation Council to
interpret ambiguous statutes consistent with the Fundamental Laws of the
Diné,28 ultimately based its decision on an interpretation of the Navajo Bill of
Rights that is consistent with the Navajo Common Law concept of hazhó’ógo. The
Court described hazhó’ógo as “a fundamental tenet informing [Navajos] how [they]
must approach each other as individuals.”29 Hazhó’ógo, the Court stated, requires
that Navajos conduct themselves with patience and respect for other Navajos,
including in the custodial interview setting.30 Investigator Snyder’s conduct of the
interview did not meet the standards of hazhó’ógo.31 Those standards also require
that police provide an advice of rights form and explain all rights on the form so
that a criminal defendant has a “minimum understanding of the impact of any
waiver.”32
Because there was insufficient evidence that Investigator Snyder had
explained each of the rights on the advice of rights form, Mr. Rodriguez’s waiver
of his rights was not “knowing and voluntary,” even in the absence of
coercion. 33 Noting the importance of the fundamental right against selfincrimination and the difficulty, in view of the District Court’s reliance on the
inadmissible confession, of retroactively reviewing the case without the confession
in evidence, the Court vacated Rodriguez’s conviction.34
This case note focuses on two aspects of Rodriguez: (1) the rationale
developed by the Navajo Nation Supreme Court to hold that due process requires
“knowing and voluntary” waivers for admissibility of confessions obtained while
in police custody, and (2) how that rationale differs from that of the United States
Supreme Court in Miranda. The latter relied upon the protection against selfincrimination present in the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 35 While the Navajo Nation Supreme Court considered federal
sources, including Miranda, the Fifth Amendment, and the ICRA, it based its
decision on an interpretation of the Navajo Bill of Rights that is consistent with the
traditional Navajo concept of hazhó’ógo. Consistent with the directive of the
Navajo Nation Council in the Fundamental Laws of the Diné, the Court’s approach
in Rodriguez takes into account, and fashions substantive law from, Diné bi
beehaz’áanii, or Navajo Common Law.

25

Id. ¶¶ 31-37.
Id.
27
Id. ¶¶ 31-32.
28
Id. ¶ 31. See Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CN-69-02 (November 1, 2002) (amending Title 1 of the
Navajo Nation Code to recognize the Fundamental Laws of the Diné).
29
Rodriguez, ¶ 38 (VersusLaw).
30
Id. ¶¶ 38-39.
31
Id. ¶ 39. The Court’s guidance for proper use of advice of rights forms and conduct of police
interviews will be discussed further in section IV (c), below.
32
Id. ¶ 40. See also id. ¶ 34.
33
Id. ¶¶ 26, 30, 40.
34
Id. ¶¶ 43-44.
35
Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
26
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The structure of this case note is as follows: Following the introductory
Section I, the case note continues, in Section II, with an introduction to the
Fundamental Laws of the Diné and the Navajo Nation Supreme Court’s
implementation thereof, as well as a discussion of the Court’s approach to
interpreting the federal Bill of Rights, the Navajo Bill of Rights, and
the ICRA. Section III provides a review of the two major sources of federal law
considered by the Court in Rodriguez, namely the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as applied in the Miranda opinion, and the ICRA. Section IV
discusses the Court’s adoption and adaptation of Miranda so as to fashion uniquely
Navajo guidelines to safeguard the right against self-incrimination in the context of
custodial interviews. Section V attempts to place the Court’s opinion
in Rodriguez in context, suggesting that it fits comfortably both in the Court’s wellestablished practice of applying Navajo Common Law to the resolution of legal
disputes and also in the Court’s more recent practice of implementing the directives
of the Fundamental Laws of the Diné in all appropriate circumstances.
I. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court’s Approach to Interpreting
Constitutional and Statutory Sources of Law
A. The Fundamental Laws of the Diné
1. Navajo Nation Council Resolution No. CN-69-02
The Navajo Nation Council began the codification of Navajo customary or
consuetudinary law with the adoption of the Fundamental Laws of the Diné,
Navajo Nation Council Resolution No. CN-69-02 (“Fundamental Laws”).36 The
Fundamental Laws directs the judges of the Navajo Nation courts to apply Diné bi
beehaz’áanii, or Navajo Common Law37 when interpreting laws and rendering
judgments. 38 The need for further development and exposition of Diné bi
beehaz’áanii was explicitly recognized:
36

Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CN-69-02, supra note 27. See generally Robert Yazzie, Air,
Light/Fire, Water and Earth/Pollen: Sacred Elements That Sustain Life, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 191
(2003); Kenneth Bobroff, Diné Bi Beenahaz’áanii: Codifying Indigenous Consuetudinary Law in the
21st
Century,
5 TRIBAL
L.J. (2004/2005),
http://tlj.unm.edu/articles/volume_5/_dine_bi_beenahazaanii__codifying_indigenous_consuetudinary_la
w_in_the_21st_century/index.php. Bobroff defines “consuetudinary law” as “the unwritten law of
custom.” Id. § I, note 2. “Consuetudinary law” has also been defined as “[a]ncient customary law that is
based on an oral tradition.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 900 (8th ed. 2004). Res. No. CN-69-02
grew out of the Navajo Common Law Project, commissioned in 1999 by Edward T. Begay, Speaker of
the Navajo Nation Council. See Bobroff § IV; Henry Barber, Navajo Common Law Project:
Researching Our Original Diné Laws 6 (Oct. 6, 2002) (unpublished manuscript prepared by the Office
of the Speaker, Navajo Nation Council) (on file with the University of New Mexico School of Law
Library).
37
Bobroff, supra note 35, § II. See also id. §§ III, IV. According to the Fundamental Laws, “these laws
have not only provided sanctuary for the Diné Life Way but [have] guided, sustained and protected the
Diné as they journeyed upon and off the sacred lands upon which they were placed since time
immemorial.” Res. No. CN-69-02, supra note 27, ¶ 2. See Bobroff, supra note 35, § V.
38
Bobroff, supra note 35, § V(B). “The leader(s) of the judicial branch (Alááaji’ Haskéé’ji
Naat’ááh) shall uphold the values and principles of Diné bi beenahaz’áanii in the practice of peace
making, obedience, discipline, punishment, interpreting laws and rendering decisions and judgments[.]”
Res. CN-69-02, supra note 27, Exhibit “A,”§ 3(E).
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The Navajo Nation Council further finds that all the details and
analysis of these laws cannot be provided in this
acknowledgment and recognition, and such an effort should not
be attempted; the Navajo Nation Council finds that more work
is required to elucidate the appropriate fundamental principles
and values which are to be used to educate and interpret the
statutory laws already in place and those that may be enacted;
the Council views this effort today as planting the seed for the
education of all Diné so we can continue to Walk In Beauty[.]39
Consistent with this recognition, the Fundamental Laws requires that
judges learn, develop and teach the principles of Navajo law when they base their
decisions thereon, for the benefit of all Navajos: “The Navajo Nation Council
further finds that all elements of the government must learn, practice and educate
the Diné on the values and principles of these laws; when the judges adjudicate a
dispute using these fundamental laws, they should thoroughly explain so that we
can all learn[.]”40
2. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court and the Fundamental Laws
The Supreme Court has implemented the directive of the Fundamental
Laws to “interpret statutes consistent with Navajo Common Law” when “the plain
language of a statute does not cover a particular situation or is
ambiguous.”41 However, where “the plain language . . . applies and clearly requires
a certain outcome[,]” the Court has applied the statutory language
directly. 42 Rodriguez demonstrates the Court’s commitment to carrying out the
mandate of the Fundamental Laws: 43 Despite the inability of counsel at oral
argument to discuss the relevant authority, the Court on its own initiative
conducted an analysis and fashioned a basis for its decision that is consistent
with Diné bi beehaz’áanii.44 The Court’s approach to the Fundamental Laws is
considered in greater detail in Section V, below.
39

Res. CN-69-02, supra note 27, ¶ 9. See Bobroff, supra note 35, § VI.
Res. CN-69-02, supra note 27, ¶ 8. See Bobroff, supra note 35, § VI. The Navajo Nation judiciary has
a long history of applying and developing Navajo Common Law that predates the adoption of the
Fundamental Laws. See, e.g., id. § II; Bennett v. Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, No. A-CV-2690, 1990.NANN.0000016, ¶ 42 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 1990) (VersusLaw) (“When the Navajo
Nation and the United States concluded a treaty in 1868 to establish government-to-government
relations, the Navajo People reserved their rights to self-government and to use their customs and
traditions as law. . . . To the extent that those customs and traditions are fundamental and basic to
Navajo life and society, they are higher law.”). See also Paul Spruhan, Case Note: Means v. District
Court of the Chinle Judicial District and the Hadane Doctrine in Navajo Criminal Law, 1 TRIBAL
L.J. (2000/2001), http://tlj.unm.edu/articles/volume_1/spruhan/index.php (non-member Indian married
to Navajo is hadane or “in-law” under Navajo law and by virtue of such marriage consents to Navajo
criminal jurisdiction).
41
Tso v. Navajo Hous. Auth., No. SC-CV-10-02, 2004.NANN.0000013, ¶ 41 n.1 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Aug.
26, 2004) (VersusLaw) (declining to apply Navajo Common Law where language of Navajo Nation
Code is clear and unambiguous).
42
Id.
43
Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, No. SC-CR-03-04, 2004.NANN.0000014, ¶ 24 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Dec.
16, 2004) (VersusLaw).
44
Id.
40
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B. Federal Interpretations of Ambiguous Constitutional and Statutory
Provisions are not Binding on the Navajo Nation Courts
In considering sources of constitutional law such as the federal Bill of
Rights, the Navajo Bill of Rights, and the ICRA, as well as both federal and Navajo
statutory law that contain ambiguous language, the Court noted that it is not
required to apply federal interpretations of such sources.45 The Court’s overarching
duty is to interpret such sources consistent with the Fundamental Laws.46 The
Court stressed the importance of this approach when the Navajo Nation Council
explicitly adopts language from federal sources, such as the Fifth Amendment or
the ICRA, or enacts statutes with similar language: “Indeed, Navajo understanding
of the English words adopted in statutes may differ from the accepted Anglo
understanding.”47 The Court further noted that the ICRA does not require the Court
to apply federal interpretations of civil rights provisions, but rather only requires
that the Court apply similar language, interpreted consistent with tribal cultural
values.48
While the Court is not required to apply federal interpretations, it does
consider them in its analysis.49 The Court considers “all ways of thinking and
possible approaches to a problem . . . and weigh[s] their underlying values and
effects to decide what is best” for the Navajo people.50 The Court has in the past
applied federal interpretations, augmented with traditional Navajo values, often
resulting in broader rights than provided by federal law or federal interpretations of
equivalent Navajo statutory law.51 The Court considers this approach particularly
appropriate where it adjudicates a dispute involving Navajo governmental
institutions: “Our consideration of outside interpretations is especially important
for issues involving our modern Navajo government, which includes institutions
such as police, jails, and courts that track state and federal government structures
not present in traditional Navajo society.”52
III. Sources of Related Federal Law
The Court considered two sources of federal law in reaching its decision:
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, and the ICRA. 53 Each of these
sources is addressed in turn.

45

Id. ¶ 31.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. The Court noted the agreement of federal courts with this approach: “Federal courts have declined
to blindly apply federal interpretations of an equivalent constitutional provision in certain circumstances
when tribal cultural values dictate a different outcome.” Rodriguez ¶ 31.
49
Id. ¶ 32.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id., ¶¶ 26, 35-38 (VersusLaw).
46
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A. The Fifth Amendment Right of Freedom from Involuntary SelfIncrimination
In Miranda v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that a
criminal suspect’s Fifth Amendment right to freedom from involuntary selfincrimination applied to statements obtained during interviews conducted in police
custody. 54 The Court, stressing the importance and fundamental nature of the
right,55 provided specific minimum procedural safeguards for the admissibility of
statements made during custodial interrogations:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination. . . . Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement
he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently.56
As
noted
by
the
Navajo
Nation
Supreme
Court
in Rodriguez,57 the Miranda court pointed to the American colonists’ reaction to
17th century English criminal procedure as a source of the Fifth Amendment:
[I]f an accused person be asked to explain his apparent
connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with
which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial
character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to
browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a
corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so
painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials . . . made the
system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total
abolition. . . . So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system
impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists
that the States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to
question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so
that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence,
became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a
constitutional enactment.58
54

Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 439, 444-445 (1966). The Fifth Amendment states, in
pertinent part: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
55
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
56
Id. The United States Supreme Court defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.” Id.
57
Rodriguez, ¶¶ 35-37 (VersusLaw).
58
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442-443 (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-597 (1896)).
The Miranda court stated that the crucial event in the development of the right against self-incrimination
came in the 1637 trial of John Lilburn, who refused to take the Star Chamber Oath, which would have
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The Miranda court reasoned that the right against self-incrimination is
founded on government’s respect for the dignity and integrity of its citizens:
[T]he constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the
respect a government—state or federal—must accord to the
dignity and integrity of its citizens. To maintain a fair stateindividual balance, to require the government to shoulder the
entire load, to respect the inviolability of the human
personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands
that the government seeking to punish an individual produce
the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather
than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his
own mouth. In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only when the
person is guaranteed the right to remain silent unless he
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.59
The case of Ernesto Miranda presented the United States Supreme Court
with a custodial interrogation that did not involve adequate procedural safe
guards.60 Mr. Miranda was arrested at home and taken into custody at a Phoenix
police station, where he was identified by a witness. 61 Two police officers
questioned him in ‘Interrogation Room No. 2’ of the detective bureau.62 Within two
hours, the officers had obtained a written statement signed by Miranda.63 During
the interrogation, the officers did not advise Miranda that he had a right to have an
attorney present, 64 and there was conflicting evidence regarding whether the
officers had told Miranda of his right to remain silent.65 The Court described the
advice of rights included in the statement as follows: “At the top of the statement
was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made voluntarily, without
threats or promises of immunity and ‘with full knowledge of my legal rights,
understanding any statement I make may be used against me.’”66 One officer read
the advice of rights to Miranda, but only after he had made an oral confession.67
Miranda was found guilty of rape and kidnapping, and his conviction was upheld
by the Supreme Court of Arizona.68

required him to answer any and all questions put to him. 384 U.S. at 458-459. Lilburn claimed that it
was a fundamental right that one not be compelled to testify against oneself. Id. at 459. Parliament
subsequently abolished the Star Chamber, and the right against self-incrimination gained popular
support. Id. “These sentiments worked their way over to the Colonies and were implanted after great
struggle into the Bill of Rights.” Id.
59
Id. at 460 (internal citations omitted).
60
Miranda’s case was the lead case among four consolidated cases that the Miranda court decided. See
id. at 491-499.
61
Id. at 491.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 491-92.
64
Miranda at 491.
65
Id. at 492 n.66.
66
Id. at 492.
67
Id. at 492 n.67.
68
Id. at 492.
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For the Miranda court, such custodial interrogation without adequate
safeguards preserving the right against self-incrimination did not satisfy the
mandate of the Fifth Amendment:69
The entire thrust of police interrogation [in cases such as
Ernesto Miranda’s] was to put the defendant in such an
emotional state as to impair his capacity for rational judgment.
The abdication of the constitutional privilege—the choice on
his part to speak to the police—was not made knowingly or
competently because of the failure to apprise him of his rights;
the compelling atmosphere of the in-custody interrogation, and
not an independent decision on his part, caused the defendant to
speak.70
The United States Supreme Court reversed Miranda’s conviction because
his waiver of his right against involuntary self-incrimination did not satisfy
constitutional requirements: “The mere fact that he signed a statement which
contained a typed-in clause stating that he had ‘full knowledge’ of his ‘legal rights’
does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish
constitutional rights.”71
B. Indian Civil Rights Act
The Court in Rodriguez noted another federal source of law regarding the
right
against
self-incrimination:
the
Indian
Civil
Rights
Act
(“ICRA”).72 The ICRA provides, in pertinent part: “No Indian tribe in exercising
powers of self-government shall . . . compel any person in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.”73 While acknowledging the ICRA in passing, the Court
did not focus its analysis or base its decision thereon, preferring instead to dwell on
a similar provision in the Navajo Bill of Rights.74 The Court’s decision to focus
in Rodriguez on the Navajo Bill of Rights rather than on the ICRA is not
inconsistent with the Court’s prior jurisprudence.75
69

The United States Supreme Court recently declined an opportunity to overrule or scale back Miranda,
choosing instead to reaffirm it. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)
(affirming Miranda warnings as constitutionally based protection not susceptible to legislative
abolition). But cf. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (explaining Miranda and Dickerson)
(failure to give Miranda warning does not require suppression of the physical fruits of a suspect’s
unwarned but voluntary statements).
70
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465 (discussing Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)).
71
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492
72
Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, No. SC-CR-03-04, 2004.NANN.0000014, ¶ 26 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Dec.
16, 2004) (VersusLaw).
73
25 U.S.C. § 1302(4) (West, Westlaw through November 22, 2005).
74
See Rodriguez, ¶ 26 (VersusLaw); id. ¶ 27 (“Our Navajo Bill of Rights, as informed by the Navajo
value of individual freedom, prohibits coerced confessions.”). See also Eriacho v. Ramah District Court,
No. SC-CV-61-04, 2005.NANN.0000001, ¶ 30 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Jan. 5, 2005) (VersusLaw) (discussing
Rodriguez) (“We adopted the federal Miranda standard as consistent with the Common Law
interpretation of the Navajo Bill of Rights to judge the validity of a waiver of the right against selfincrimination and an attorney while in police custody.”).
75
See, e.g., Duncan v. Shiprock Dist. Ct., No. SC-CV-51-04, 2004.NANN.0000017, ¶ 45 n.4 (Navajo
Sup. Ct. Oct. 28, 2004) (VersusLaw) (where Navajo Bill of Rights recognizes greater right than that
afforded by the ICRA, the Court need not consider federal interpretations of the latter); Bennett v.
Navajo Board of Election Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90, 1990.NANN.0000016, ¶¶ 32-34, 39-41
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IV. Adopting and Adapting Miranda
A. The Navajo Bill of Rights’ Protection against Coerced Self-incrimination
The Navajo Nation courts recognize the Navajo Bill of Rights as one
source of the right against coerced self-incrimination. 76 In Navajo Nation v.
McDonald, the Supreme Court held that this right against self-incrimination is
fundamental and can only be waived under precise circumstances:77 “An individual
must not give information to be used for his or her own punishment unless there is
a knowing and voluntary decision to do so.”78 In McDonald, the Court interpreted
the Navajo Bill of Rights in light of the Navajo Common Law rejection of
coercion.79
In Rodriguez, the Court reiterated and reaffirmed the principles it
enunciated
in McDonald 80
while
extending McDonald to
custodial
81
interrogations. The Navajo Nation police, as an arm of the Navajo government,
must recognize and respect a person’s rights to the same degree as do the
courts.82 Thus, the right against coerced self-incrimination attaches at the time a
criminal suspect is taken into custody and interviewed.83
Inspector Snyder’s use of an advice of rights form during Mr. Rodriguez’s
interrogation put the question of the applicability of Miranda v. United
States squarely before the Court. 84 The Court held that Miranda’s minimum
requirements are consistent with the Navajo Bill of Rights’ protection against
coerced self-incrimination and with Navajo values.85 Furthermore, these minimum
requirements apply across the Navajo Nation.86
B. The Court Explains the Navajo Common Law Principle of Hazhó’ógo
The Court went further, holding that the mere provision of a standardized
advice of rights form to a criminal defendant in custody does not satisfy the
(Navajo Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 1990) (VersusLaw) (applying Navajo Bill of Rights rather than the ICRA to
nullify an act of the Navajo Tribal Council).
76
Rodriguez, ¶ 26 (VersusLaw).
77
Id. (citing Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, No. A-CR-10-90, 1992.NANN.0000007, ¶ 90 (Navajo Sup.
Ct. Feb. 13, 1992) (VersusLaw)).
78
MacDonald, ¶ 90 (VersusLaw).
79
Id. ¶ 91. “Navajo common law rejects coercion, including coercing people to talk. Others may ‘talk’
about a Navajo, but that does not mean coercion can be used to make that person admit guilt or the facts
leading to a conclusion of guilt.” Id. See also Rodriguez, ¶ 26 (VersusLaw).
80
Rodriguez, ¶ 27 (VersusLaw). “Our Navajo Bill of Rights, as informed by the Navajo value of
individual freedom, prohibits coerced confessions.” Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
The Court previously had occasion to consider the applicability of Miranda v. United States, but had
not before Rodriguez explicitly held that Miranda’s minimum requirements are consistent with Navajo
values. Rodriguez, ¶ 33 (VersusLaw).
85
Rodriguez, ¶ 33 (VersusLaw). Miranda’s minimum requirements, as adopted by the Court, are
discussed further in section IV (c), below.
86
Rodriguez, ¶ 33 (VersusLaw).
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requirements of Navajo Common Law.87 The relationship of the Navajo Nation
government to its citizens requires more from the Navajo Nation police:
The relationship between the Navajo Nation government and its
individual citizens requires the same level of respect as the
relationship between one person to another. In our Navajo way
of thinking we must communicate clearly and concisely to each
other so that we may understand the meaning of our words and
the effect of our actions based on those words. The
responsibility of the government is even stronger when a
fundamental right, such as the right against self-incrimination,
is involved.88
This government-to citizen relationship is consistent with the Navajo
Common Law principle of hazhó’ógo.89 This principle informs Navajos how they
must approach each other as individuals:90
When discussions become heated, whether in a family setting,
in a community meeting or between any people, it’s not
uncommon for an elderly person to stand and say “hazhó ‘ógo,
hazho’ogo sha’alchini.” The intent is to remind those involved
that they are Nohookaa Dine’e, dealing with another Nohookaa
Dine’e, and that therefore patience and respect are due. When
faced with important matters, it is inappropriate to rush to
conclusion or to push a decision without explanation and
consideration to those involved. Aaddd na’nile’dii el dooda.
This is hazhó’ógo, and we see that this is an underlying
principle in everyday dealings with relatives and other
individuals, as well as an underlying principle in our
governmental institutions.91
The Court observed that the Navajo Nation’s adopted ways, including
court and police procedures, are to be conducted in accordance
with hazhó’ógo.92 Inspector Snyder’s conduct toward Mr. Rodriguez, by contrast,
was not in accordance with hazhó’ógo:
The transaction between Rodriguez and Investigator Snyder,
and the way that the advice of rights form was presented to
Rodriguez does not conform with the ways that people should
87

Id. ¶ 34.
Id. The Court’s description of the proper government-to-citizen relationship is reminiscent of
the Miranda court’s own language. See Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (quoted
hereinabove at section III, n.58). Indeed, the Court noted that the Miranda court’s discussion of the
origin of the right against coerced self-incrimination prompted its own application of hazhó’ógo to the
case at hand. See Rodriguez, ¶ 38 (VersusLaw).
89
Rodriguez, ¶¶ 38-40 (VersusLaw).
90
Id. ¶ 38. The Court described hazhó’ógo as “a fundamental tenet informing [Navajos] how [they]
must approach each other as individuals[,]” requiring that Navajos conduct themselves with patience
and respect for other Navajos, including in the custodial interview setting. Id. ¶¶ 38-39.
91
Id. ¶ 38. The Court offered translations of the following terms: hazhó ‘ógo, hazho’ogo
sha’alchini( “hazhó’ógo, hazhó’ógo my children”), id. ¶ 50 n.3; Nohookaa Dine’e (“Earth-surfacepeople (human beings)”), id. ¶ 51 n.4; and Aaddd na’nile’dii el dooda (“Delicate matters and things of
importance must not be approached recklessly, carelessly, or with indifference to consequences.”), id. ¶
52 n.5.
92
Id. ¶¶ 38-39.
88
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interact. We must never forget that the accused is
still Nohookaa Diné’é, and that he or she is entitled to truthful
explanation and respectful relations regardless of the nature of
the crime that is alleged.93
C. The Court Provides Specific Guidance for the Conduct of Custodial
Interrogations Consistent with Hazhó’ógo
1. Miranda’s Minimum Requirements for Police Conduct Toward Persons in
Custody
Miranda’s minimum requirements for custodial interrogations apply
across the Navajo Nation.94 Navajo Nation police must provide clear notice of the
following to every person in custody: the right to remain silent and request the
presence of an attorney during questioning; that any statements may be used in
evidence against the person; the right to an attorney; and the right to appointment
of an attorney, if indigent.95
2. Ultra-Miranda Requirements
a. Hazhó’ógo Requires Both Respectful Treatment and Meaningful Notice and
Explanation of Rights
Police must act toward persons in custody in a respectful manner,
with hazhó’ógo in mind.96 Hazhó’ógo requires clear and concise communication in
a manner that allows understanding of spoken words and the effects of actions
taken based on those words.97 All Navajos are entitled to “truthful explanation and
respectful relations” regardless of the offense alleged.98 “[A] police badge cannot
eliminate an officer’s duty to act toward others in compliance with the principles
of hazhó ‘ógo.”99
b. Detailed Requirements for Admissibility of Statements Obtained through
Custodial Interrogations
Statements obtained pursuant to signed waivers will be admissible as
voluntarily given only where police (1) provide an advice of rights form and (2)
explain to a person in custody his or her rights so that the person has sufficient
understanding of the rights he or she is waiving.100 Providing an English language
form, without more, is insufficient.101 Sufficiency of explanation requires that the
93

Rodriguez, ¶ 39 (VersusLaw).
Id. ¶ 33.
95
Id. Cf. Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (quoted hereinabove at section III, n.55).
96
Rodriguez, ¶¶ 34, 38-39 (VersusLaw).
97
Id. ¶ 34.
98
Id. ¶ 39.
99
Id.
100
Id. ¶ 40.
101
Rodriguez ¶ 40. The Court suggested that forms should be free from typographical, spelling and
grammatical errors, since such errors might affect the required clarity or explanation. Id. ¶ 53 n.6.
94
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rights be explained in Navajo to Navajo speakers and in English to those who do
not speak or understand Navajo, “so that the person has a minimum understanding
of the impact of any waiver.”102
V. Putting Rodriguez in Context
The courts of the Navajo Nation have a long-established tradition, predating the Fundamental Laws of the Diné, of applying Navajo customs and
traditions to resolve legal disputes. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court’s opinion
in Rodriguez fits squarely within that tradition. At the same time, in Rodriguez and
numerous opinions handed down since the adoption of the Fundamental Laws of
the Diné by the Navajo Nation Council, the Court not only manifests its
unrelenting commitment to that tradition but also develops the case law necessary
to implement the Fundamental Laws and sends a clear message to the lower courts
and practitioners alike: Where the Navajo Nation Code does not unambiguously
dictate the outcome of a dispute, or case law that is consistent with Diné bi
beehaz’áanii is unavailable, and there exists a decisional basis in Diné bi
beehaz’áanii, one must argue Diné bi beehaz’áanii in the courts of the Navajo
Nation.
A. A History of Applying Navajo Common Law
Well before the Navajo Nation Council promulgated the Fundamental
Laws of the Diné, judicial courts operating within the Navajo Reservation
employed Navajo customs and traditions as a decisional basis for resolving
disputes, demonstrating a preference for Navajo Common Law rather than western
law.103 Navajo judges presiding in the Court of Indian Offenses, which operated in
the Navajo Nation between 1892 and 1959, resolved disputes using Navajo
customs despite the availability of and pressure from the federal government to
apply a federal legal code and its western legal reasoning.104 The practice of using
Navajo customs and traditions to resolve legal disputes continued after the
establishment of the courts of the Navajo Nation in 1959,105 a practice initially
102

Id. ¶ 40.
See Navajo Nation v. Platero, No. A-CR-0491, 1991.NANN.0000001, ¶¶ 21-22 (Navajo Sup. Ct.
Dec. 5, 1991) (VersusLaw); Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Election Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90,
1990.NANN.0000016, ¶ 42 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 1990) (VersusLaw); Russel Lawrence
Barsh, Putting the Tribe in Tribal Courts: Possible? Desirable?, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 74, 83-84
(1999); James W. Zion, Law as Revolution in the Courts of the Navajo Nation, 20 FEDERAL BAR
ASSOCIATION INDIAN LAW CONFERENCE 333, 344-51 (1995); Raymond D. Austin, ADR and
the Navajo Peacemaker Court, 32(2) JUDGES’ JOURNAL 8, 10-11 (1993); Daniel L.
Lowery, Developing a Tribal Common Law Jurisprudence: The Navajo Experience 1969-1992, 18 AM.
INDIANL. REV. 379, 383 (1993); Tom Tso, Moral Principles, Traditions, and Fairness in the Navajo
Nation Code of Judicial Conduct, 76 JUDICATURE 15, 16 (1992). See also Bethany R. Berger, Justice
and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047,
1070-71, 1074 (2005); Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the
Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1137-38 (2004).
104
See Platero, ¶ 21 (VersusLaw); Zion, supra note 102, at 344-46; Austin, supra note 102, at 11;
Tso, supra note 102, at 16.
105
See 7 N.N.C. § 201 (2005) (history note); Zion, supra note 102, at 350 n.70 (Courts of the Navajo
Nation established by Navajo Tribal Council Res. CO-69-58 (October 16, 1958) and CJA-5-59 (Jan. 9,
103
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permitted by the Navajo Tribal Council (at least in civil cases)106 and eventually
mandated by the Navajo Nation Council.107 The Navajo Nation Supreme Court’s
opinion in Rodriguez, which applies the traditional Navajo principle of hazhó’ógo,
is clearly consistent with this well-established practice.
B. A New Practice, Yet Consistent with Tradition
But Rodriguez is also part of a more recent practice, adopted by the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court since shortly after promulgation of the Fundamental
Laws of the Diné, of explicitly applying Diné bi beehaz’áanii where possible in a
manner that implements, explains, and is consistent with the Fundamental Laws
themselves.108,109 To the extent that this more recent practice seeks to make use of
Navajo Common Law as a decisional basis, it is consistent with the Court’s
aforementioned long-established practice. At the same time, the Court has
1959)). See also James W. Zion, Civil Rights in Navajo Common Law, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 523, 53644 (2001-2002); Lowery, supra note 102, at 387-88; Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in
Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 229-31 (1989). See generally Kristen A. Carpenter, Considering
Individual Religious Freedoms under Tribal Constitutional Law, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 561,
586-87 (2004-2005); Jayne Wallingford, The Role of Tradition in the Navajo Judiciary: Reemergence
and Revival, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 141, 148-50 (1994). However, Navajo Common Law does
not appear in practice to have been the law of preference in the courts of the Navajo Nation in at least
the first two decades after their formation in 1959. See Stephen Conn, Mid-Passage–The Navajo Tribe
and Its First Legal Revolution, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 329, 366 (1978). See also Zion, supra note
102, at 350-51. The publication of court opinions began in 1969. See Lowery supra note 102, at
390. See also Zion supra note 102, at 351; Wallingford, supra, at 153; Krakoff, supra note 102, at 1130.
106
See Lowery, supra note 102, at 387-88; Tso, supra note 104, at 229-30. See also Bobroff, supra note
35, § III; Barber, supra note 35, at 6.
107
7 N.T.C. § 204 (Supp. 1985). See Lowery, supra note 102, at 387-88; Tso, supra note 102, at 16;
Tso, supra note 104, at 230.
108
A VersusLaw (online) search of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation between
November 1, 2002 and October 9, 2006 (the most recent opinion posted on VersusLaw as of January 18,
2007) uncovered 76 opinions, of which 38 (half) mention Navajo common or traditional law, Diné bi
beehaz’áanii(or beenahaz’áanii), or the Fundamental Laws. Of these 38 cases, 29, including Rodriguez,
cite and apply Diné bi beehaz’áanii or the Fundamental Laws or rely upon cases that do so, while seven
apply Navajo Common Law without mentioning or citing cases that implement Diné bi beehaz’áanii or
the Fundamental Laws. The absence of an explicit mention of the Fundamental Laws or Diné bi
beehaz’áanii in most of the latter seven cases might be explained by the proximity of these decisions to
the date of adoption of the Fundamental Laws and the relatively advanced stage of those proceedings as
of that date. See Begay v. Navajo Nation Election Admin., No. SC-CV-27-02, 2003.NANN.0000008, ¶
14 (Navajo Sup. Ct. July 31, 2003) (VersusLaw); In re Marriage of Whitehorse, No. SC-CV-30-00,
2003.NANN.0000009, ¶ 20 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Mar.17, 2003) (VersusLaw); Benally v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
No. SC-CV-05-01, 2003.NANN.0000023 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Nov. 24, 2003) (VersusLaw); Peabody
Western Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation Labor Comm’n, No. SC-CV-14-03, 2003.NANN.0000001 (Navajo
Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 2003) (VersusLaw); Leuppe v. Wallace, No. SC-CV-21-2001, 2003.NANN.0000018, ¶
16 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Jan. 10, 2003) (VersusLaw). The remaining two of the 38 cases neither apply the
Fundamental Laws or Navajo Common Law nor rely on cases that do so.
109
Additional evidence of the Court’s recent practice may be seen from a search of all Navajo Nation
Court cases posted on VersusLaw as of January 18, 2007: Twenty-five cases mention Diné bi
beehaz’áanii (or beenahaz’áanii), only four of which were decided prior to November 1,
2002. See Davis v. Means, No. A-CV-23-93, 1994.NANN.0000006 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 1994)
(VersusLaw); Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Election Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90, 1990.NANN.0000016
(Navajo Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 1990) (VersusLaw); Rough Rock Cmty. Sch. v. Navajo Nation, No. SC-CV06-94, 1995.NANN.0000008 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 1995) (VersusLaw); Howard v. Navajo Bd. of
Election Supervisors, No. A-CV-65-90, 1991.NANN.0000019 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Mar. 6, 1991)
(VersusLaw).
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undertaken to carry out the explicit directive of the Fundamental Laws to “uphold
the values and principles of Diné bi beenahaz’áanii in the practice of peace
making, obedience, discipline, punishment, interpreting laws and rendering
decisions and judgments”110 while interpreting the directive for the benefit of lower
court judges, practitioners, and the Navajo people. The Court’s dedication to this
undertaking is exemplified in Rodriguez and numerous other cases cutting across
numerous areas of law, including 111 civil rights, 112 criminal procedure, 113 civil
procedure, 114 appellate procedure; 115 residential and commercial landlord-tenant
law,116 employment law,117 contracts,118 and domestic relations.119
110

Navajo Nation Council Res. No. CN-69-02, supra note 27, Exhibit “A,”§ 3(E).
The assignment of cases to particular areas of substantive law in the footnotes that follow is intended
only as a suggestive guide and is non-exhaustive. Many of the cases cited below could be assigned to
more than one area of substantive law.
112
See Navajo Nation v. Kelly, No. SC-CR-04-05, 2006.NANN.0000012, ¶¶ 27-30 (Navajo Sup. Ct.
July 24, 2006) (VersusLaw) (protection against double jeopardy); Duncan v. Shiprock Dist. Ct., No. SCCV-51-04, 2004.NANN.0000017, ¶¶ 37-39, (Navajo Sup. Ct. Oct. 28, 2004) (VersusLaw) (right to a
jury trial for counterclaims in repossession case); Navajo Hous. Auth. v. Bluffview Resident Mgmt.
Corp., No. SC-CV-35-00, 2003.NANN.0000021, ¶¶ 34-35 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Dec. 17, 2003)
(VersusLaw) (analyzing right to hearing prior to dissolution of injunction); A.P. v. Tuba City Family
Ct., No. SC-CV-02-05, 2005.NANN.0000007, ¶ 33 (Navajo Sup. Ct. May 26, 2005) (VersusLaw) (writ
of mandamus proper where due process violated by district court’s issuing exclusion order without a
hearing).
113
See Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, No. SC-CR-03-04, 2004.NANN.0000014 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Dec. 16,
2004) (VersusLaw) (waiver of right against self-incrimination in custodial interview); Eriacho v. Ramah
Dist. Ct., No. SC-CV-61-04, 2005.NANN.0000001, ¶¶ 34, 36 n.1 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Jan. 5, 2005)
(VersusLaw) (waiver of right to jury trial); Thompson v. Greyeyes, No. SC-CV-29-04,
2004.NANN.0000009, ¶¶ 27-28 (Navajo Sup. Ct. May 24, 2004) (VersusLaw) (granting writ of habeas
corpus for defendant wrongfully detained for violation of domestic violence protective order); H.M. v.
Greyeyes, No. SC-CV-63-04, 2004.NANN.0000018, ¶ 24 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Oct. 13, 2004) (VersusLaw)
(procedure for obtaining, and scope of, writ of habeas corpus in juvenile cases); Navajo Nation v.
Morgan, No. SC-CR-02-05, 2005.NANN.0000018, ¶¶ 19-20 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2005)
(VersusLaw) (guilty plea in criminal case invalid where not made knowingly and intelligently); Navajo
Nation v. Badonie, No. SC-CR-06-05, 2006.NANN.0000003, ¶ 25 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Mar. 7, 2006)
(VersusLaw) (right to speedy trial in criminal cases); Seaton v. Greyeyes, No. SC-CV-04-06,
2006.NANN.0000005, ¶¶ 26-27 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Mar. 28, 2006) (VersusLaw) (same).
114
See Judy v. White, No. SC-CV-35-02, 2004.NANN.0000007, ¶ 55 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Aug. 2, 2004)
(VersusLaw) (initial pleading requirement) (Resolution CN-69-02 instructs judges and justices to take
notice of Diné bi beehaz’áanii in their decisions, when applicable, but does not impose requirement
that Diné bi beehaz’áanii be raised in the initial pleading); Mitchell v. Davis, No. SC-CV-52-03,
2004.NANN.0000012, ¶ 23 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Aug. 16, 2004) (VersusLaw) (Rule 60 of the Navajo Rules
of Civil Procedure (relief from judgment or order) embodies Navajo principles of fairness and finality).
115
See Fort Defiance Hous. Corp. v. Lowe, No. SC-CV-32-03, 2004.NANN.0000005, ¶17 (Navajo Sup.
Ct. Apr. 12, 2004) (VersusLaw) (interpreting bond requirement of forcible entry and detainer statute in
residential context); Fort Defiance Hous. Corp. v. Allen, No. SC-CV-01-03, 2004.NANN.0000010, ¶¶
36 n. 3, 37 n.4 (VersusLaw) (prospective application of holding regarding conflict between statute and
court rule with respect to timely appeals in forcible entry and detainer cases); Allen v. Fort Defiance
Hous. Corp., No. SC-CV-05-05, 2005.NANN.0000019, ¶¶ 20-25 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 2005)
(VersusLaw) (allowing de novo review of facts, but not an entire new trial, on appeal in forcible entry
and detainer cases); In re Bizardi, No. SC-CV-55-02, 2004.NANN.0000016, ¶¶ 19-20 (Navajo Sup. Ct.
Nov. 9, 2004) (VersusLaw) (concept of mootness and bar on advisory opinions consistent with Navajo
principle of k’é).
116
See Navajo Nation v. Arviso, No. SC-CV-14-05, 2005.NANN.0000009, ¶¶ 31-35 (Navajo Sup. Ct.
Aug. 11, 2005) (VersusLaw) (forcible entry and detainer in commercial lease context) (_Diné bi
beehaz’áanii_ does not recognize “equitable lease” for business purposes). Cf. Lowe, ¶¶ 20-22, 28, 30
(VersusLaw) (providing guidelines to trial courts regarding due process requirements for eviction orders
in residential forcible entry and detainer cases).
111
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The Court has also sought to clarify how and when the directive of the
Fundamental Laws requires the Court to apply and teach Diné bi
beehaz’áanii rather than other sources of law. 120 The Court in Tso v. Navajo
Housing Authority, No. SC-CV-10-02 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Aug. 26, 2004), citing
cases in which it had interpreted statutes in accordance with the mandate of the
Fundamental Laws, and others in which it had applied the plain language of the
statute, explained its approach as follows:
We have applied this mandate when the plain language of a
statute does not cover a particular situation or is ambiguous, but
have applied the plain language directly when it applies and
clearly requires a certain outcome. This approach flows from
the relationship between the judicial and legislative branches in
our current Navajo form of government, as it is ultimately the
responsibility of the Navajo Nation Council to make policy for
the Navajo people, and our Court to apply it when clear and
valid. When unclear, we apply the tools of statutory
interpretation given to us by the Council, which require us
to give meaning to the Council’s ambiguous language
consistent with the fundamental principles of the Navajo
people.121
Thus, the Court will not apply the Fundamental Laws to the exclusion of
or
in
derogation
of
unambiguous,
controlling
Navajo
statutory
117

See Goldtooth v. Naa Tsis’ Aan Cmty. Sch., Inc., No. SC-CV-14-04, 2005.NANN.0000008, ¶ 31
(Navajo Sup. Ct. July 18, 2005) (VersusLaw) (applying concept of naat ‘aanii, an individual with a
persuasive role within a community, to find apparent authority and uphold employment agreement);
Etsitty v. Dine Bii Ass’n for Disabled Citizens, Inc., No. SC-CV-48-04, 2005.NANN.0000015, ¶¶ 28-29
(Navajo Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 2005) (VersusLaw) (setting forth factors for test to determine whether an
employee is an independent contractor); Kesoli v. Anderson Sec. Agency, No. SC-CV-01-05,
2005.NANN.0000013, ¶ 27 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Oct. 12, 2005) (VersusLaw) (shouting by supervisor
constitutes “harassment” under Navajo Preference in Employment Act and just cause for termination);
Taylor v. Dilcon Cmty. Sch., No. SC-CV-73-04, 2005.NANN.0000012, ¶ 20 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Oct. 7,
2005) (VersusLaw) (doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is consistent with fundamental
Navajo principles); Tso v. Navajo Hous. Auth., No. SC-CV-10-02, 2004.NANN.0000013, ¶ 41 n.1
(Navajo Sup. Ct. Aug. 26, 2004) (VersusLaw) (termination for cause) (notwithstanding the Fundamental
Laws, Navajo Nation courts must directly apply provisions of the Navajo Nation Code where they
control and clearly require a particular outcome); Smith v. Navajo Nation Dep’t of Head Start, No. SCCV-50-04, 2005.NANN.0000011, ¶ 24 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Sept. 21, 2005) (VersusLaw) (“[O]rdinarily a
violation of a clear rule set out in a personnel manual for which termination is a result of noncompliance is ‘just cause.’ However, an employee may challenge the enforcement of that rule as
impossible to fulfill under the circumstances of the case or as violating Navajo public policy.”).
118
See Allstate Indem. Co. v. Blackgoat, No. SC-CV-15-01, 2005.NANN.0000002, ¶¶ 26-27 (Navajo
Sup. Ct. Jan. 12, 2005) (VersusLaw) (prejudgment interest in insurance claim arising out of auto
accident), aff’d, Allstate Indem. Co. v. Blackgoat, No. SC-CV-15-01, 2005.NANN.0000017, ¶¶ 14, 31
(Navajo Sup. Ct. May 20, 2005) (VersusLaw) (declining to reverse previous ruling in same case because
of the strong public policy of the Navajo Common Law concept of nályééh).
119
See Begay v. Chief, No. SC-CV-08-03, 2005.NANN.0000004, ¶¶ 25-27 (Navajo Sup. Ct. May 18,
2005) (VersusLaw) (refusing to recognize common law divorce); Kascoli v. Kascoli, No. SC-CV-08-05,
2005.NANN.0000014, ¶¶ 22, 24 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Nov. 15, 2005) (VersusLaw) (remanding to trial court
with instructions to consider applicability of Diné bi beehaz’áanii to distribution of property).
120
See, e.g., Tso, ¶ 41 n.1 (VersusLaw) (declining to apply Navajo Common Law where language of
Navajo Nation Code is clear and unambiguous).
121
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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law.122,123 Furthermore, the Court will not disturb, but rather will apply established
precedents that interpret the plain meaning of statutory language. 124 Where,
however, the language of the Navajo Nation Code is ambiguous or does not control
the disputed issue, the court will look to Diné bi beehaz’áanii to fashion a
resolution.125
Rodriguez’s progeny shows that the Court continues both to heed the
directive of the Fundamental Laws and build on its precedents that apply it. For
example, the Court in Eriacho v. Ramah District Court, No. SC-CV-61-04 (Navajo
Sup. Ct. Jan. 5, 2005) again applied the traditional Navajo principle
of hazhó’ógo where the knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to a jury trial
was at issue,126 stating that the court would look both to Diné bi beehaz’áanii and
federal law to address issues relating to criminal procedure:
122

Id. See also Smith v. Navajo Nation Dep’t of Head Start, No. SC-CV-50-04, 2005.NANN.0000011,
¶¶ 24, 27-28 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Sept. 21, 2005) (VersusLaw) (violation of clear rule set out in personnel
manual is “just cause” for termination under Navajo Preference in Employment Act provided rule does
not violate the public policy of the Navajo Nation as expressed by the Council in the Navajo Nation
Code or in Diné bi beehaz’áanii). Thus, the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation interprets the
Fundamental Laws of the Diné as a directive to fill in the interstices of, and resolve ambiguities in, the
Navajo Nation Code using Navajo Common Law, not an invitation to supplant the Code with Navajo
Common Law. See Tso, ¶ 41 n.1.
123
Editor’s note: The opinions reviewed for this case note (those decided prior to October 10, 2006 and
published in the VersusLaw database as of January 18, 2007) neither squarely posit nor conclusively
resolve the question of whether an applicable provision of the Navajo Nation Code controls even if the
Court determines the provision conflicts with Diné bi beenahaz’áanii. However, in In re Lee, No. SCCV-32-06 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Aug. 11, 2006) (not yet available on VersusLaw as of April 11, 2007), the
Court invalidated the residency and continuous presence provisions of the Navajo Election Code,
enacted prior to passage of the Fundamental Laws of the Diné, as inconsistent with Diné bi
beenahaz’áanii. See Ernestine Tsinigine, The Fundamental Laws of the Diné, (unpublished student
paper, University of New Mexico School of Law) (on file with the author) .
124
Begay, ¶ 25 (VersusLaw) (“case law stating the plain meaning of statutory language still controls the
outcome of later cases”). See also Navajo Nation v. Badonie, No. SC-CR-06-05, 2006.NANN.0000003,
¶ 25 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Mar. 7, 2006) (VersusLaw) (applying factors for evaluating allegation of violation
of right to speedy trial established by case law, interpreted in light of Diné bi beehaz’áanii). But
see Eriacho v. Ramah Dist. Ct., No. SC-CV-61-04, 2005.NANN.0000001, ¶ 36 n.1 (Navajo Sup. Ct.
Jan. 5, 2005) (VersusLaw) (a previous interpretation of statutory language is not binding if the language
is unclear and the Court did not consider Navajo Common Law in its analysis).
125
See, e.g., Duncan v. Shiprock Dist. Ct., No. SC-CV-51-04, 2004.NANN.0000017, ¶¶ 37-39 (Navajo
Sup. Ct. Oct. 28, 2004) (VersusLaw) (ambiguity of term “miscellaneous” in statute in the context of a
fundamental right requires interpretation consistent with Diné bi beehaz’áanii); H.M. v. Greyeyes, No.
SC-CV-63-04, 2004.NANN.0000018, ¶ 24 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Oct. 13, 2004) (VersusLaw) (ambiguity in
Rule 26 of the Navajo Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure (governing writ practice) requires
examination of Diné bi beehaz’áanii, or Navajo Common Law principles, on the status of children);
Kesoli v. Anderson Sec. Agency, No. SC-CV-01-05, 2005.NANN.0000013, ¶ 27 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Oct.
12, 2005) (VersusLaw) (“Lacking any guidance in the [Navajo Preference in Employment Act], the
Court adopts Anderson’s suggested definition of ‘harassment’ as consistent with the policies of the
statute and Diné bi beehaz’áanii”).
126
Eriacho, ¶¶ 30-31 (VersusLaw) (criminal defendant’s alleged waiver of right to jury trial not
“knowing and intelligent” where arraignment waiver form failed to explain right may be waived by
inaction). See also Navajo Nation v. Kelly, No. SC-CR-04-05, 2006.NANN.0000012, ¶¶ 27-30 (Navajo
Sup. Ct. July 24, 2006) (double jeopardy). The Court in Eriacho stated:
As Hozho’go requires meaningful notice and explanation of a right before a waiver of that right is
effective, it requires, at a bare minimum, that the Nation give notice that the right to a jury trial may be
waived by inaction. For notice to be meaningful, and therefore a waiver to be effective, the Navajo
government must explain to the defendant that the jury trial right is not absolute, as it may be waived by
doing nothing within a certain time. Absent this explanation, the information received by a defendant is
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This means that we are not bound to follow previous case law
that applies federal standards to our Bill of Rights without
consideration of Common Law, but may review the question
again in light of Navajo principles. However, we still consider
federal approaches to the problem, particularly when the use of
non-traditional devices such as courts, police, and jails are at
issue.127
The Court again applied hazhó’ógo in Navajo Nation v. Morgan, No. SCCR-02-05 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Nov. 8, 2005), following both Rodriguez and Eriacho,
holding invalid a guilty plea that was not made knowingly and intelligently.128 In
addition, the Court has also adopted and adapted state law where necessary,
augmented by traditional Navajo principles, much as the Rodriguez court adopted
and
adapted
the
federal law
of the
United
State
Supreme
Court’s Mirandaopinion.129
The Court’s opinion in Rodriguez provides additional teaching regarding
the implementation of the Fundamental Laws, admonishing the district courts of
the Navajo Nation and practitioners alike to apply Diné bi beehaz’áanii where
appropriate. Impelled by the directive of the Fundamental Laws, the Court on its
own initiative conducted an analysis and fashioned a basis for its decision that is
consistent with Diné bi beehaz’áanii. 130 The Court made the following
“preliminary observation” concerning the oral argument before the Court:131
Neither side was prepared to discuss the confession
admissibility issue. Rodriguez’s brief contains no citation to
any statute, case law, or Navajo common law or principle
concerning confessions, and his counsel did not submit any at
the oral argument. When asked about the Indian Civil Rights
incomplete, as it appears the right is automatic and perpetual, like the federal constitutional right.
Without this information, the waiver by inaction is not truly knowing and intelligent, and would violate
the defendant’s right to due process. As the description of the right to jury trial in the waiver of
arraignment form does not include a statement that the right must be exercised within fifteen days,
Eriacho’s failure to request it within that time was not a knowing and intelligent waiver.
E Eriacho, ¶ 31 (VersusLaw) (emphasis added). See also id. ¶ 30 (discussing application of same Navajo
Common Law principle of hozho’go in Rodriguez). The author notes the different orthographic
representations for the same Navajo Common Law principle. Compare Navajo Nation v. Rodriguez, No.
SC-CR-03-04, 2004.NANN.0000014, ¶¶ 38-39 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 2004)
(VersusLaw) (hazhó’ógo) with Eriacho, ¶¶ 30-31 (VersusLaw) (hozho’go).
127
Eriacho, ¶ 36 n.1 (VersusLaw).
128
Navajo Nation v. Morgan, No. SC-CR-02-05, 2005.NANN.0000018, ¶¶ 19-20 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Nov.
8, 2005) (VersusLaw) (failure of courts and other governmental officials to proceed carefully and
patiently, clearly explaining a defendant’s rights before accepting a waiver thereof, is inconsistent
with hazhó’ógo).
129
See Etsitty v. Dine Bii Ass’n for Disabled Citizens, Inc., No. SC-CV-48-04, 2005.NANN.0000015, ¶¶
28-29 (Navajo Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 2005) (VersusLaw) (adapting New Mexico Supreme Court “control
test,” setting forth factors to determine whether an employee is an independent contractor, to include
additional factors to “foster harmony by honoring the expectations of the parties under the Navajo
principle of k’é.”).
130
Rodriguez, ¶¶ 24, 31-34, 38 (VersusLaw). Cf. Goldtooth v. Naa Tsis’ Aan Cmty. Sch., Inc., No. SCCV-14-04, 2005.NANN.0000008, ¶¶ 31, 38 n.4 (Navajo Sup. Ct. July 18, 2005) (VersusLaw) (applying
traditional Navajo concept of naat’aanii, or individual with a persuasive role within a community)
(“This Court questioned both sides at oral argument as to the effect, if any, on the case if the Executive
Director were considered a naat’aanii.”)
131
Rodriguez, ¶ 24 (VersusLaw).
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Act, the Navajo Bill of Rights, and the possible application
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), his counsel
admitted having no knowledge of any of these sources of law.
The Navajo Nation, though showing knowledge of these laws,
admitted having no knowledge of the actual facts in this case to
apply them, asserting that she was not the attorney who
presented the case to the lower court. Ordinarily, we rely on the
parties, especially the appellant, to argue their points and
provide us with guidance on the relevant law and its application
to the record in the case. We would be severely limited in our
discussion if we were to rely on the parties in this case. Because
the issues are of such importance to the Navajo Nation, we
cannot limit ourselves to the arguments made by the parties.132
If there is a general “take-home message” in Rodriguez for practitioners
and judges in the courts of the Navajo Nation,133 it is that arguing and using Navajo
Common Law as a decisional basis for legal disputes is mandatory, not optional,
whenever the Navajo Nation Code is ambiguous or silent on a contested issue and
case law that is consistent with Diné bi beehaz’áanii is unavailable. 134 As the
Navajo Nation Supreme Court demonstrated in Rodriguez, counsel who fail to
provide a decisional basis in Diné bi beehaz’áanii law may find that the Court will
provide its own rationale, one that is not informed by, and is possibly unrelated to,
the arguments counsel presented to the Court.
VI. Conclusion
In Rodriguez, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court settled the question of
whether Miranda applies on the Navajo Nation but went much further, placing
additional evidentiary requirements on voluntary waivers obtained through
custodial interrogations. The Court derived these requirements by looking to the
Navajo Common Law principle of hazhó’ógo and applying it to the police custody
context. In doing so, the Court fulfilled its directive from the Navajo Nation
Council to consider the Fundamental Laws of the Diné in reaching its decision and
to explain its reasoning for the benefit of all Diné.

132

Id. (emphasis added).
The fact-specific take-home message of Rodriguez is its specific holdings regarding the right against
self-incrimination in the context of, and the proper conduct of, custodial interviews. Id. ¶ 40.
134
The message might also be stated as follows: If the Navajo Nation Code, or settled precedent that is
consistent with Diné bi beehaz’áanii, does not unambiguously dictate the outcome of a dispute, and if
there exists a decisional basis in Diné bi beehaz’áanii, or Navajo Common Law: then find it, argue it,
and base the holding on it. If you don’t, the Supreme Court of the Navajo Nation may well do it for you.
133

